2012年12月19日水曜日

Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games


Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew and Stuart A. West
PNAS December 17, 2012 201210960

公共財ゲームと「同じ状況で他者の存在を知らせない(投資をし報酬を得る:報酬は公共財ゲームと同様に他者と自分の投資額で決まるが、被験者はそのことを知らない)ケース」を比較。協力率に差なし。公共財ゲームでの協力は社会的効用では説明できない。

It has become an accepted paradigm that humans have “prosocial preferences” that lead to higher levels of cooperation than those that would maximize their personal financial gain. However, the existence of prosocial preferences has been inferred post hoc from the results of economic games, rather than with direct experimental tests. Here, we test how behavior in a public-goods game is influenced by knowledge of the consequences of actions for other players. We found that (i) individuals cooperate at similar levels, even when they are not informed that their behavior benefits others; (ii) an increased awareness of how cooperation benefits others leads to a reduction, rather than an increase, in the level of cooperation; and (iii) cooperation can be either lower or higher than expected, depending on experimental design. Overall, these results contradict the suggested role of the prosocial preferences hypothesis and show how the complexity of human behavior can lead to misleading conclusions from controlled laboratory experiments.

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