2015年3月19日木曜日

Unconscious information changes decision accuracy but not confidence

Alexandra Vlassova, Chris Donkin, and Joel Pearson
PNAS November 11, 2014 vol. 111 no. 45 16214-16218

「意識に上らない情報」は知覚的意思決定の正確性を向上させるが、確信度には影響を与えない。

The controversial idea that information can be processed and evaluated unconsciously to change behavior has had a particularly impactful history. Here, we extend a simple model of conscious decision-making to explain both conscious and unconscious accumulation of decisional evidence. Using a novel dichoptic suppression paradigm to titrate conscious and unconscious evidence, we show that unconscious information can be accumulated over time and integrated with conscious elements presented either before or after to boost or diminish decision accuracy. The unconscious information could only be used when some conscious decision-relevant information was also present. These data are fit well by a simple diffusion model in which the rate and variability of evidence accumulation is reduced but not eliminated by the removal of conscious awareness. Surprisingly, the unconscious boost in accuracy was not accompanied by corresponding increases in confidence, suggesting that we have poor metacognition for unconscious decisional evidence.

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